Israel-Hezbollah tensions escalate with deadly strikes

This episode delves into the escalating violence between Israel and Hezbollah, examining the background, current events, and potential consequences of their interactions.

1. The conflict has escalated following a deadly attack by Hezbollah in the Golan Heights, killing Israeli children.
2. Israel has responded with significant military actions, including assassinations of key figures within Hezbollah and Hamas.
3. Both sides are operating under a set of unwritten rules which have evolved and are currently being tested.
4. The regional influence of Iran and internal political pressures in Israel are complicating the situation.
5. There is a real concern among experts that these tensions could spiral into a wider regional conflict.

1: Opening Remarks

Rachel Levy McLaughlin introduces the episode's focus on the recent escalations between Israel and Hezbollah. She highlights the seriousness of the situation and its potential implications. Rachel Levy McLaughlin: "Since October, there has been a violent back and forth between Israel and Hezbollah..."

2: The Incident in Golan Heights

Discussion about the Hezbollah attack that killed twelve children in the Golan Heights, setting off the latest round of violence. Thomas Juneau: "This attack is very complicated in many ways... it's tragic."

3: Responses and Repercussions

Analysis of Israel's military responses, including the assassination of a Hezbollah commander and a Hamas leader in Iran. Thomas Juneau: "Israel killed one of the most senior commanders of Hezbollah, Fuad Shokr, in response to Hezbollah killing twelve children."

4: Broader Regional Dynamics

Exploration of the geopolitical context, including Iran's support for Hezbollah and the strategic calculations of all parties involved. Thomas Juneau: "Iran wants to keep it that way, Hezbollah wants to keep it that way, because in a situation of open war, they lose."

5: Looking Ahead

Speculation on the future of this conflict and what signs might indicate a shift to a more intense level of warfare. Thomas Juneau: "Civilians being targeted on a large scale on different sides would be a sign that we're crossing into a more full blown conflict."

1. Stay informed about international conflicts to better understand their implications.
2. Support peaceful resolutions and dialogues between conflicting parties.
3. Advocate for humanitarian aid in conflict zones.
4. Encourage diplomatic engagements and international mediation.
5. Raise awareness about the impact of war on civilians to foster empathy and support for peace initiatives.

Since the war in Gaza broke out in October, Israel and Hezbollah have been engaged in constant military strikes. At the end of July, the violence escalated when 12 Druze children were killed by a rocket hitting a soccer field in the Golan Heights. A string of high profile assassinations followed, raising the already-high tensions in the region.

Thomas Juneau is an associate professor of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa who specializes in security in the Middle East. He’s on the show to talk about how countries in the region are calculating their moves to avoid an all-out war.

People

Thomas Juneau, Rachel Levy McLaughlin

Guest Name(s):

Thomas Juneau

Content Warnings:

Discussion of violence and child casualties.

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Rachel Levy McLaughlin
Since October, there has been a violent back and forth between Israel and Hezbollah, the lebanese militant group.

There have been rocket attacks, drone strikes, assassinations.

At the end of July, it escalated.

It began with a rocket attack that killed twelve children, followed by a series of high profile assassinations.

On Tuesday, israeli war planes flew over Beirut, breaking the sound barrier and shaking windows throughout the city. And Hezbollah launched drone attacks in northern Israel.

All of this is fueling concerns that this might lead to a regional war.

Thomas Junot is an associate professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa. Today he's on the show to talk about the significance of what's happened over the last couple of weeks and how countries in the region are calculating their moves to avoid an all out war.

I'm Rachel Levy McLaughlin and this is the decibel from the Globe and Mail.

Thomas Juneau
Tomas, thank you so much for being here.

Thomas Juneau
Thanks for having me.

Thomas Juneau
So we've seen this tit for tat between Hezbollah and Israel since October, but it has really ramped up recently.

What's different about what's happening right now compared to what we've seen in the past several months?

Thomas Juneau
There are rules of the game between Israel and Hezbollah. There were rules of the game before October 7, and there have been rules of the game since. These are not written on paper, but it's a sort of tacit understanding between the two sides on what is quote unquote acceptable in their exchange of violence and what is not. What are the red lines? The thing is that these red lines always change. They're not fixed, they're not static. So since October, obviously, these red lines have evolved quite a bit. And a lot of what we're seeing, one way to try to understand what's going on, is both sides tried to push these red lines in their favor. So since October 7, both sides have been shooting at each other a lot. That's why several kilometers wide of communities on both sides of the border have been evacuated to protect the civilians.

More recently, however, in the last couple weeks, Israel killed one of the most senior commanders of Hezbollah, Fuad Shokr, in response to Hezbollah killing twelve children in the Golden Heights, which is a territory that Israel has occupied and annexed in what is the north of Israel.

And at the same time, Israel also assassinated a Hamas commander in Iran. That's stretching the red lines a lot.

Thomas Juneau
I'd like to talk through this series of events that sort of brought us to where we are right now. And I think we should start with the one that sort of kicked this all off. And that was the attack on Magdal Shams, which is a predominantly druze village in the Golan Heights. This was the attack that killed twelve children on a soccer field.

Rachel Levy McLaughlin
What was it about this attack that.

Thomas Juneau
Sort of set this all off?

Thomas Juneau
So this attack is very complicated in many ways. I mean, obviously it's tragic. I mean, twelve children died. But this being in the Golan Heights made it very sensitive, because the Golan Heights is territory that Israel annexed in 1967, when there was the six day war between Israel on the one side and mostly Egypt and Syria, backed by other arab states on the other side. Israel at that time seized the Sinai from Egypt, Gaza from Egypt, the West bank from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria? Israel has occupied that territory since it has annexed it. The thing, though, is that there's only one country in the world that has recognized Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, and that's the United States, which did that under the Trump administration. And interestingly, the Biden administration never reversed that recognition. But Canada, for example, or the EU or the rest of the countries in the world do not recognize the Golan Heights as being part of Israel. And the kids who were killed in that attack were not israeli citizens. A lot of the Druze and other inhabitants of the Golden Heights have been offered israeli citizenship, but many of them have refused it. So that makes the whole situation pretty complicated.

Thomas Juneau
Right. So what was it about this attack that kind of launched us into, you know, this escalation?

Thomas Juneau
The main difference is that twelve civilians died there have been civilian casualties in the tit for tat exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah since October, especially on the lebanese side, but not on that scale. So that's twelve kids plus several that were injured on top of the twelve who were killed.

That provoked a significant wave in Israel in favor of doing something about Hezbollah. And here there's a key debate that is going on inside Israel that predates October 7, but that has really intensified since, which is what do we do about Hezbollah? Right. From Israel's perspective, Hezbollah is on Israel's northern border. It has been attacking Israel in the name of the quote unquote, resistance. Right. The opposition to Israel's occupation of palestinian lands, in many cases literally a lack of a recognition of Israel's legitimacy and its right to exist. That has intensified a lot since October 7. So for a lot of Israelis, this provoked very much a movement in the direction of, okay, now we really need to do something about Hezbollah.

Thomas Juneau
The US and Israel have both said that Hezbollah was responsible for this attack, but Hezbollah itself says that it wasn't responsible. What do you make of their response?

Thomas Juneau
In the hours after that strike, a number of Hezbollah affiliated or Hezbollah loyal channels, on social media, on Telegram, for example, claimed the attacker said that it was Hezbollah. But Hezbollah very quickly came out and said, no, we didn't do it.

To my mind, there is no plausible reason to believe that it is not Hezbollah. Every indication is that it is Hezbollah. That being said, I have not seen indication that Hezbollah would have done this on purpose. The most plausible explanation is that Hezbollah was targeting a nearby israeli military installation and they missed and tragically they hit that soccer field. Why would then Hezbollah deny it? Simply because Hezbollah opposes Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights. Hezbollah considers that that bit of territory should go back to Syria. Therefore, in this narrative, Hezbollah killed kids who shouldn't be in Israel. So for Hezbollah, this was very awkward. This was very uncomfortable politically, and that's why they did nothing, claim this attack.

Thomas Juneau
Then Israel responds by striking Beirut just a couple of days later. This attack killed a leader in Hezbollah, Fouad Shukr, who Israel said was responsible for this attack in the Golan Heights. What was the impact of that strike on Beirut?

Thomas Juneau
So Fuad Shukr is one of the most senior commanders in Hezbollah.

He has been a key member of Hezbollah since its inception in the early 1980s when Hezbollah was created with a lot of iranian and syrian support in the context of the lebanese civil war. He's been involved in a whole series of important attacks by Hezbollah over the years. The Americans actually had a $5 million bounty on Shukr's head. Right. So that gives you an idea of how prominent a leader within Hezbollah he was from Hezbollah's perspective and understanding that we're very much in a tit for tat, you know, dynamic here. From Hezbollah's perspective, when one of its most senior commanders is killed, of course it perceives that it has to retaliate, that not retaliating will be perceived by Israel but also by Hezbollah's constituents as weakness and a lack of resolve. There's also very much an internal dynamic at play here that when members of Hezbollah are killed, especially senior members, there will be pressure inside the movement. Right. To defend one of our own.

Thomas Juneau
So this was an attack on a Hezbollah leader, but it did happen in Lebanon. Can you just remind us what the relationship is between Hezbollah and Lebanon?

Thomas Juneau
So that's a very complicated question to answer in a minute and a half because it's a complicated relationship. So Hezbollah, as I said a few minutes ago, Hebola was born in the 1980s, the early eighties, in the context of the lebanese civil war. Over the decades, Hezbollah has emerged not only as the main Shia group in Lebanon, but Hezbollah has also emerged as by far the most powerful actor inside Lebanon. And in the post civil war context, the war ended in 1990. Hezbollah refused to disarm, unlike a number of other militias and groups in that war, which allowed it to not only grow in parallel to the lebanese armed forces, the national army, but in fact, Hezbollah today is far more powerful than the lebanese armed forces. But also Hezbollah in more recent decades has become a player involved in the governance of Lebanon. It's not just a militia that does its thing on the side. It has members of parliament that have been elected in successive elections. It has had ministers. Its political wing has been not only very active politically, it has a foreign policy. It has foreign relations all over the world with other Iran backed groups, but also to raise funds in more or less illicit activities in West Africa and South America, even here in Canada to some extent. But also it provides social services, which has been very essential to allow it to grow its base inside Lebanon.

Thomas Juneau
And you mentioned iranian support. I'm just curious if you can walk us through sort of the relationship between Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas and how Iran sort of fits into this.

Thomas Juneau
So it's a very close relationship. And in the absence of iranian support, Hezbollah is nowhere near, nowhere near the powerful actor it is today. Iran has very much an anti american, anti israeli, anti saudi foreign policy. And the key thing about Iran is that in military terms, in conventional military terms, Iran is far weaker than the US and Israel. If you think about conventional military power, tanks, fighter aircraft and things like that. In an open conventional war, the US annihilates Iran. Iran is very much aware of that. So over the decades, Iran has made the choice to support non state armed groups, terrorist groups, in some cases militias, insurgents, rebels, and provide them with asymmetric capabilities, mines, explosive devices, but also, you know, AK forty seven s and things like that. And now over the years, also missiles, rockets and drones. So the three main groups that Iran supports like that in the region are Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the palestinian territories, and now the Houthis in Yemen. These three groups are non state actors involved in the governance of their territories. To various degrees. In conventional military terms, they're not weak, but what makes them really threatening is their missiles, their rockets, their drones. So these are symbiotic relationships. And the last point that I just mentioned quickly here is there is a bit of a mistaken tendency in western commentary to describe these groups, the three main ones, but also a whole bunch of smaller ones in Iraq and Syria and elsewhere, as pawns or puppets of Iran.

And a word that gets thrown around a bit is proxies, which I think is very much an inaccurate understanding of how those relationships work. They work together. They share common interests. They share to at least some extent a common ideology. But its more of a partnership and cooperation and not a top down Iran telling people what to do type of relationship.

Thomas Juneau
Well be right back.

So after the strike on Lebanon, there was another assassination.

Ismail Hania, who was a top Hamas leader, was assassinated in Iran. Who was Haniya? What was his role within Hamas?

Thomas Juneau
So a couple minutes ago, we talked about how Hezbollah has political and military wings. Hamas is similar. It has political and military wings. These wings work together. Right. They're not isolated from one another. It's part of one whole organization. The military wing does the fighting on the ground. The political wing does the diplomacy, the foreign relations, the negotiations with adversaries, but also all the relations with friends. Right. Hamas talks and works with the Houthis and Hezbollah and Iran all the time. And you need a bureaucratic apparatus to actually manage that on a day to day basis. So on the ground in Gaza right now, it's the military wing that is doing the fighting, because the fighting is so central to what Hamas is right now. The military wing has been the most influential. The military wing is led and has been led for a while by an individual named Yahya Sinwar. Ismail Haniyyah was until the assassination, you referred to the leader of the political wing.

He has been in exile. He hasn't been based in Qatar, in Doha, the capital, for a number of years now. It is from there that he was managing ceasefire negotiations indirectly with Israel, but also dealing with Iran and Hezbollah and others, dealing with international actors, doing a lot of fundraising, too, and things like that. So Haniyyah is the one who was in Iran for the inauguration of the new iranian president, and that's where he was reported assassinated, reportedly. And there's no reason to believe otherwise by Israel.

Thomas Juneau
But Israel hasn't actually taken responsibility for this assassination?

Thomas Juneau
No, Israel has not taken responsibility for the assassination. There's an element of plausible deniability that Israel often adopts for external intelligence operations.

Historically, Israel has very often done that. But there's little reason to believe at this point that it's not Israel. And actually, there's been media reports in the Washington Post and the New York Times where unnamed american officials say that israeli officials confirmed it to them that it was Israel.

Thomas Juneau
Hmm. Hania was often talked about as the sort of moderating force within Hamas. Can you tell me what that means in this context?

Thomas Juneau
Good question. I'm happy that you asked that because there's been a lot of, I'd say, fairly pointless debate, especially on social media. Right. That happens on the issue of what is a moderate, and was he a moderate in a group like Hamas? There's a number of people who have been saying there's no such thing as a moderate. They're all terrorists, which I think is a misunderstanding of what the word means and implies in any political entity, terrorist group, criminal group, state democracy, dictatorship, good guy, bad guy, whichever. There is always a spectrum of political views. That spectrum can be extremely broad, especially in a dynamic democracy, from left to right, from far left to far right. But even in the most brutal dictatorships in the world, let's take North Korea, there's always some daylight between individuals who are a bit more radical, a bit more conservative, or a bit more pragmatic, a bit more moderate. They want a bit more opening of the economy, a bit less, et cetera, et cetera. That's true in North Korea, it's true in Iran, where there are minor differences between senior regime individuals. And it's also true in a movement like Hamas. Of course, Haniyyah was a senior member of Hamas. He was a terrorist. He was anti Israel, he was deeply anti semitic. All of these things are absolutely true. And describing him as a moderate is not meant to deny that there are individuals in Hamas who want to fight to the end, who want to fight to the death. They will not compromise or negotiate with Israel, period, except on a very, very tactical basis.

There are other individuals within Hamas, and Chania was one of them, who, relatively speaking, were moderates within the movement, meaning that they were more open to negotiating a ceasefire with Israel, more open to a truce, etcetera, without, of course, them rejecting any of Hamas long term objectives, which was opposition to Israel's existence. Could some of these moderates in Hamas have been involved at some point in the future, hypothetically, in negotiation towards a two state solution? There's a debate at that level. I think there's grounds to be skeptical of how possible that would be, even for moderate Hamas leaders.

But when we're talking about at least a ceasefire, clearly there was some tactical.

Thomas Juneau
Difference between Hamas leaders and Hamas announced earlier this week that the replacement for Hinia will be Yahya Sinwar, who you mentioned earlier, he was one of the architects of the October 7 attack and the head of Hamas in Gaza.

What do you make of that?

Thomas Juneau
What this means is that, unlike what was the case until just a few days ago, the military and political wings are fused under one individual. In practice, how much of an institutional change does that imply? Is not clear, but probably not that much. But it does mean that small daylight that I was talking about between moderates and hardliners within Hamas very much shrinks because the hardliner, who's leading the war in a very intransigent way, will now also be leading the negotiations. There's an ideological distinction, but there's also very much of a logistical dimension. Right. Chaniyeh was leading the ceasefire negotiations from Doha. He was actually physically there. The Israelis were just a few rooms away, maybe a few floors away in the same building. Now, Sinwar is going to have to coordinate ceasefire negotiations from a war zone in Gaza, where he is deeply hidden in bunkers and tunnels. So for him to communicate with negotiators outside of Gaza will be extremely complicated and very slow.

Thomas Juneau
So now that Sinwar has sort of taken over this position, what does that mean for ceasefire talks and a potential end to this war?

Thomas Juneau
Haniyyah's death is not good news for prospects for a ceasefire because he was keeping in mind how we mean this in relative terms, but he was a moderate within the movement, more open to some kind of ceasefire and truce with Israel. Sinuar seems less open to that. Add to that the logistical dimension, that it will just be much more complicated for him to coordinate discussions. It might take days sometimes to relay messages to deep inside his tunnels and so on. That's true, but that's a very narrow reading of what's going on.

In my view, and I had been saying this in the media before the assassination of Chania, prospects for ceasefire were not good.

I did not see one as imminent in any way and certainly not in the short term and not for a reasonable definition of a midterm. So ultimately, haniyyah being killed doesnt fundamentally change that.

Thomas Juneau
So given everything weve talked about, what kind of calculations are the countries in the region making here? Iran, Israel, Lebanon, what are they balancing?

Thomas Juneau
So, on the side of Iran and Lebanon, if we talk about Hezbollah a bit, Iran and Lebanon and Hezbollah are in a bit of an uncomfortable situation in many ways because they absolutely oppose Israel. They support Hamas, they support what they call the cause of resistance.

They're anti american, anti israeli, anti saudi and so on. But like we said earlier on, they don't want open war. And understanding that the situation we're in now is not open war. Israel likes to call it the war between the wars. Others call it the gray zone or the hybrid war, where it's obviously not peace, clearly, but it's not open warfare. Right. And by that I mean total war of the armies literally going at each other directly. We're in a situation of indirect or limited or grey zone or hybrid conflict. Iran wants to keep it that way. Hezbollah wants to keep it that way, because in a situation of open war, they lose. Because, again, the US and Israel are vastly more powerful in conventional terms. And in this situation of indirect or limited violence, Iran can exploit the chaos, Iran can exploit the vulnerabilities, Iran can exploit the weaknesses of states throughout the region. That's where Iran thrives. Right. And to me, Iran has been quite clear since October and so has Hezbollah, that they want to push back at Israel, they want to hit Israel, they want to lob missiles on Israel and so on. But they are very careful to calibrate these provocations to make sure that it doesn't escalate.

Do they still want that after the assassination of Aniya, the assassination of Shukr? I don't know. Red lines have been pushed back so much and a miscalculation or a spark could just lead things to explode, even if the different sides don't want it.

Thomas Juneau
What about the israeli side? What sort of calculations are they making? Do they have the same desire to avoid all at war?

Thomas Juneau
So that's a great question, and it's difficult to answer that. It depends who you refer to in Israel. And ultimately I get it that there's one government with one ultimate decision point. But within the security services and the military, there's been a lot of leaks in the media, israeli media, american media, that the military and the security services are calling for a bit more restraint, not because they're friends of Hamas, but because they have their hands full with Hamas. Think about it. It's been nine months, and Hamas has not even been close to defeated yet. And now there's talk about opening a new front in northern Israel against Hezbollah, which is far more powerful than Hamas. So they're urging for more caution. They're urging for more seriousness and more investment in ceasefire talks. Obviously, in israeli society, there's a lot of pressure for a ceasefire, especially for release of the remaining hostages.

But in the ruling coalition, there are a number of far right parties to the right of Benjamin Netanyahu, the prime minister, who are saying the opposite, who are saying if there's a ceasefire, we're going to quit the government, and Netanyahu is going to lose his majority in parliament. So Netanyahu, who is, whether we like him or not, he's a master tactician, right, of navigating all of these competing priorities. That's what he's done for decades that he's doing now. And he's under these extremely difficult to reconcile priorities, ceasefire. Stop the war, negotiate or continue the war, because there's a serious risk that in the event of a ceasefire, he might lose some members of his coalition on the far right and lose his majority.

Thomas Juneau
So as you said, we're not exactly in peace times right now. But what for you would be a sign that we're sort of crossing into a more full blown conflict? What would be the thing that you're looking for?

Thomas Juneau
Civilians being targeted on a large scale on different sides and putting Gaza aside for now. In Lebanon, Israel has hit civilians. In Israel, Hezbollah has hit civilians. But most of the time they try to aim for military infrastructure. You know, when I was talking about the rules of the game, it's to try as much as possible to target military assets, commanders, troops, etcetera, infrastructure. But if we are in a scenario of escalation, that red line of trying most of the time sort of to focus on military targets, that becomes seriously diluted, and we are going to see on both sides way more civilian casualties.

Thomas Juneau
Tomas, thank you so much for being here today and for talking us through all this.

Thomas Juneau
Thank you.

Thomas Juneau
That's it for today. I'm Rachel Levy McLaughlin. This episode was edited by Kevin Sexton. Our producers are Madeline White and Michal Stein. David Crosby edits the show. Adrian Chung is our senior producer, and Matt Fraynor is our managing editor. Thanks so much for listening.