War Clouds Over Lebanon as Hezbollah and Israel Clash

This episode explores the escalating tensions and potential conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, particularly following the Israeli invasion of Gaza.

1. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah has intensified, with potential to escalate into a full-scale war.
2. Both parties are preparing for severe military engagement, with Hezbollah reportedly having a large arsenal of missiles.
3. The political situation in Lebanon is increasingly tied to the conflict, affecting civilian perceptions and regional politics.
4. International mediation efforts are crucial but currently insufficient to de-escalate tensions.
5. The broader implications of the conflict could destabilize the entire Middle East region.

1. Introduction

Overview of the current state of conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, with a focus on the escalations since the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Murtazza Hossein: "A war between Israel and Hezbollah would truly be a catastrophic event for Israel, Lebanon, and the entire Middle East."

2. Historical Context

Discussion on the history of conflict between the two parties and its impact on regional stability. Sam Heller: "Israeli officials have threatened widespread retaliation in Lebanon, even in Beirut and other major city centers."

3. Political Dynamics

Analysis of Lebanon's internal political situation in relation to Hezbollah's role and its implications for the potential conflict. Sam Heller: "The only deterrent to fuller Israeli intervention in Lebanon is Hezbollah and its capabilities."

4. Regional and International Perspectives

Insights into the possible international consequences of the conflict and the role of global powers in mediation. Sam Heller: "It's plausible that it could draw in the Americans more directly, even as the Biden administration doesn't want to see an open war."

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The escalating military confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel now threatens to expand the conflict in Gaza into a full-blown regional war. For the past eight months, Israel and Hezbollah have traded missile attacks, leading to the evacuation of tens of thousands of civilians from northern Israel and southern Lebanon. The two sides have fought devastating wars in the past, but a cold peace has reigned for nearly 17 years. That peace is now in jeopardy, as Hezbollah has mobilized in sympathy with Hamas following Israel's invasion of the Gaza Strip. To discuss the situation this week on Intercepted is Sam Heller, a fellow with the Century Foundation and expert on Lebanon and Hezbollah. Heller spoke with host Murtaza Hussain on the prospects of the conflict escalating, as well as the potential impact on the Lebanese, Israelis, and the broader Middle East.

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Murtazza Hossein, Sam Heller

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Sam Heller

Content Warnings:

Discussions of war and violence

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Speaker B
This is intercepted.

Murtazza Hossein
Welcome to intercepted Im Ratazza Hossein. The israeli military and the lebanese militant group Hezbollah are currently in a state of low level conflict that began with Israels invasion of Gaza last October. This conflict has claimed hundreds of lives, mostly in Lebanon, while forcing the evacuation of tens of thousands of israeli and lebanese civilians from their homes with no prospect of return. As devastating as the war in Gaza has been, an israeli war with Hezbollah would be magnitudes worse. Hezbollah, which was originally created out of local resistance to the israeli occupation of south Lebanon, is believed to have up to 200,000 missiles ready to be fired at Israel in the case of a full blown war.

Israel, meanwhile, has threatened to destroy lebanese cities as part of a military strategy known as the Dahiya doctrine. That doctrine emphasizes inflicting mass damage to civilian infrastructure in a conflict. A war between Israel and Hezbollah would truly be a catastrophic event for Israel, Lebanon, and the entire Middle east. Though no side truly seems to want such a war, there are strong signs today that it is becoming more likely. Nonetheless, joining me now to discuss the implications of such a conflict is Sam Heller, a researcher and analyst looking at Lebanon, Syria and the wider neighborhood.

Hes a fellow with Century International, the Century Foundation center for International Research and Policy. He joins us from Beirut. Sam, welcome to Intercepted hey, thanks for. Having me to start. Can you tell us a bit about the political situation in Lebanon at the moment vis a vis Hezbollahs conflict with Israel?

Obviously, tensions have increased in the last eight months since the war in Gaza began, but hostilities between the two stem back much further. In 2006, there was a very devastating war that took place between Israel and Hezbollah, which resulted in significant destruction and loss of life in Lebanon. Since then, theres been a detente which has existed between the two sides going on 17 years or so, but at the moment, that seems to be breaking up. Israeli officials have threatened widespread retaliation in Lebanon, even in Beirut and other major city centers. In your estimation, how do people assess the risk of such a war taking place?

And what would the implications be for the lebanese people if it did happen, especially if the skirmishes expand beyond south Lebanon to where they're mostly confined today. I mean, obviously the calm that had mostly prevailed in the country's south or along, I guess they call it the blue line. Right. It's the de facto border that divides Lebanon and Israel. So the calm that had held there since 2006 broke down on October 8, the day after October 7.

Speaker B
That's when Hezbollah fired on Israeli occupied lebanese territory. The Israelis retaliated, and then it kind of turned into this ongoing tit for tat exchange of fire that has continued and then sort of mutated, transformed with time. Right. As both sides have kind of expanded the scope where they're targeting, adapted their tactics, maybe some of the weapons that they've introduced. I don't think things have entirely gotten out of control yet.

I mean, a thing that seemed to characterize the balance on the blue line prior to October 8 was that, I mean, you had both Hezbollah and Israel. Even when things would flare up, when there would be maybe a provocation or an exchange of fire, it seemed pretty clear that both sides were thinking, I think, pretty deliberately about how to effectively signal to the other to maintain a sort of reciprocity and keep up a stable deterrent balance. Now things are a lot more kinetic and violent, but it looks like both sides are still thinking in terms of how to respond, how to position themselves such that they kind of maintain deterrence opposite their enemy here. I don't think that either side has really opened things up. I think that's the concern.

But fortunately, we're not there yet. Whether that's going to happen, I don't know. Right. I mean, I don't think anyone does, except for maybe the Israelis. So I was here in October, here in Beirut, that is, and then I was out of the country in November, December, and I got back in January.

I mean, the first thing that I wanted to know when I got back was, I wanted to ask people, is like, hey, how, how concerned are you? How concerned should I be about the risk of a more open and total conflict? And I got different answers. So I think that what I heard from western diplomats and some Lebanese, I think, who had kind of visibility into some of the processes of mediation that were ongoing to de escalate on the blue line. I think they said that they were very concerned and that they treated the Israelis threats to intervene more fully, as credible and serious.

But I think that there was a real sort of cognitive dissonance when I would talk with kind of other people here in Lebanon who I think were just much less concerned either because they were preoccupied with other issues, who would just sort of put what was going on in the south out of mind, even for people who were kind of more interested in this and thinking about it more, people who basically thought that the Israelis, I mean, a, that the Israelis would not undertake a larger adventure or intervention because it's a bad idea, right? Because it doesn't make sense. Second, that they wouldn't do it because the Americans wouldn't allow it. I also think that it would be a bad idea for the Israelis to do this. I think that it would be, you know, if they attempted to invade to stage some larger intervention in Lebanon.

I think it would likely be bloody destructive mess. I mean, more for the Lebanese, but for both sides realistically. Right. But then also one that would be inconclusive, that I dont think would accomplish what the Israelis seem to be looking for. But I also dont trust them to make good choices.

I mean, having kind of seen how theyve conducted themselves basically since October 7 and in Gaza, I don't think we should necessarily assume that they're going to approach this in a totally cool headed, rational way. You've written a lot about Hezbollah in the context of the syrian conflict, and of course, the group has changed and evolved a lot since 2006, the last time that there was a war in south Lebanon. There are some estimates that Hezbollah has between 120,000 to 200,000 missiles which could be deployed against Israel in the context of such a war, if there were a conflict to take place and if Israel, say, invaded south Lebanon to establish a buffer zone or to, with the goal of seriously degrading or defeating Hezbollah, what do you think the retaliatory consequences could be from Hezbollah's perspective? What capacity do they have, which have maybe exceeded those they had in the past as a non state militant group? So I think it's hard to know, I mean, precisely what they would do, because I think Hezbollah is, I think, deliberately sort of cagey about its real capabilities and what it could bring to bear.

Like when the group is more, when it does pin a more specific number to, for example, like the number of trained Hezbollah fighters or the number of missiles and its arsenal, it's hard to know what is real and like what is maybe braggadocio or a bluff. But I think that the israeli voices that seem to be advocating a ground invasion potentially in occupation of Lebanon, potentially like 10 km north of the blue line, it doesn't make a ton of sense to me. It seems responsive to what seemed to be the preeminent israeli concerns following October 7. Prior to that, the Israelis seemed most concerned about Hezbollahs precision missile arsenal and then the ways that that could threaten israeli population centers and critical infrastructure. But after October 7, it seems like the Israelis.

And then this seems to have been additionally conveyed via mediators in some of these talks around de escalation. The Israelis seem much more concerned with this more proximate threat posed by Hezbollah on the border. Right. They don't want Hezbollah's elite Radwam forces present deployed along the border. They don't want Hezbollah to be able to mass forces there for potential like October 7 style infiltration attempt, particularly, I think after kind of in the ensuing, the exchanges of fire that have followed October 7, I think we've seen that Hezbollahs, their anti tank guided missiles have seemed particularly effective.

So I think the Israelis also want Hezbollahs forces beyond the roughly ten kilometer range of these anti tank missiles. But it seems to me if the Israelis push 10 km north, I mean, first, that's not going to be like a walk in the park, right? I think that will meet fierce resistance. Second, they'll have moved the center of gravity of this conflict a little ways north, slightly, I guess, out of range of some of these northern israeli communities from which I guess 60,000 people have been evacuated since October. But it's still going to be this hot front line where israeli forces there are going to be targeted with regularity.

It's going to be subject to infiltration attempts by Hezbollah, potentially other kind of armed factions in Lebanon, either lebanese or palestinian. And then Hezbollah has additionally, I don't think that they have unveiled the totality of their arsenal. I think that there's still some of their longer range missiles. It seems like maybe they're holding them in reserve. But then even with some of the weapons that they have employed so far, they've demonstrated a range that is beyond 10 km, they'll still be able to, with, for example, these groups of drones, they'll still be able to reach beyond that buffer and then to hold these northern israeli communities at risk.

So it does not compute for me, I mean, this idea that the Israelis could somehow, that they could intervene in this way and then get what they're looking for. Yeah. You know, Sam, one thing which is very interesting is presently the war in Gaza is in its 8th month and it's inflicted tremendous damage on Gaza. And certainly millions of people have been displaced or hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, tens of thousands have been killed. And certainly ordinary life in Gaza is no longer possible.

Speaker D
As catastrophic as that war has been, it seems the assessment of many observers would be that a war between Israel and Hezbollah would be far, far more destabilizing for people in Lebanon, people in Israel throughout the country potentially, as well as the region writ large. What is your sense of the possible escalatory risks in this conflict? If it were to stumble into a very wide ranging war between these two parties? What's the worst case scenario that could happen, and how likely do you assess that? I mean, it seems for sure that it would be devastating for both Lebanon and Israel.

Speaker B
I mean Lebanon more than Israel realistically, given sort of the disparity in relative power here. But I think it would also do real damage to Israel. The ways in which that could expand and metastasize regionally, it's hard to know. It's plausible that it could draw in the Americans more directly, even as I don't think the Biden administration wants to see an open war between Israel and Hezbollah, and I think they are making a good faith attempt to avert it. But if it happened, its possible that the Americans would intervene more fully and directly in support of Israel.

We could also see stepped up involvement by Iran and by like other members of the Iran led resistance axis. Regionally. I think it's maybe hard to know in all instances how much reserve capacity they have or how much further they can escalate. I mean, obviously a lot of them are already involved, but I think that the escalatory potential is real and substantial, and then obviously the human toll would be terrible.

Speaker E
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Speaker D
This conflict or this nascent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah started in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks and subsequent israeli invasion of Gaza describe to us the relation between these two conflicts. Obviously, Israel in some sense is disaggregating them and views its conflict with Hezbollah as in some sense independent. But Hezbollah seems to be acting out of sympathy or if not coordination with Hamas to aid or to move forces away from Gaza to force them to defend the northern border. What would the impact of a ceasefire have? Would it be salient and would it actually help perhaps avert a war, which we're describing at the moment?

Speaker B
I mean, Hezbollah and Iran are both members of this Iran led resistance axis. Over the past several years, they've promoted this idea of Wahtat al Sahat, or the unity of arenas or battlefields, and the possibility of this type of collective response in the event that any axis member comes under attack. So this conflict has been a real kind of a road test of that. Poland, Hamas, they don't seem like they are entirely simpatico. Apparently from the early years of the syrian conflict, they were sort of mutually estranged after Hamas sided with the syrian opposition militants against the government of Bashar al Assad, alongside which Hezbollah had intervened.

Likewise, Iran and various other Iran linked groups. But that's a relationship that they were subsequently able to, to mend. So they are allies, even if they arent totally of one mind. So it was Hezbollah that initiated this now months long conflict along the blue line. They justified it at the time as an act of solidarity with the palestinian people, the resistance in Gaza, but then also as a step towards liberating what remains of israeli occupied lebanese territory.

I think that rationale has subsequently evolved somewhat as this conflict has become more protracted. Now, I think that Hezbollah justifies its involvement first as what they call a support front, as a means of relieving pressure on Gaza, preoccupying the Israelis, obliging them to commit some substantial portion of their forces on Israels northern front with Lebanon. But then also I think Hezbollah will say that what theyre doing now, theyll describe it as a preemptive defense of Lebanon. I mean that realistically, the only deterrent to fuller israeli intervention in Lebanon is Hezbollah and its capabilities. And so Hezbollah, by intervening as it has and then keeping up this exchange of fire, that by now keeping up with this months long, lower grade war, that they are actually deterring the Israelis from carrying out something larger.

But I think that they will also say that theyve been, I think, suspicious of the us and other western attempts to mediate some de escalation along the blue line because theyve said that these are efforts to, to divide the fronts, to disaggregate between this conflict in Gaza and in Lebanon, which they reject. They refuse to stand down and to engage on the terms of any sort of agreement that might de escalate conflict along the blue line until there is a ceasefire in Gaza. And then critically, not a unilaterally announced de escalation or ceasefire declared from the israeli side, but one that is agreed with palestinian factions. Obviously, that has not so far been forthcoming, but I think that Hezbollah will point to the ceasefire in November, which Hezbollah also halted its attacks, as evidence that a Gaza cease fire would similarly unlock calm on the blue line with the Israelis. I mean, it seems like they may be operating according to slightly different calculus.

It seems like from the start, per at least some american and israeli reporting that weve seen, there was discussion in the israeli government of intervening preemptively against Hezbollah, I guess on the grounds that this war was Hezbollah, that was the war that Israel had prepared for, and that Hezbollah was the more serious threat to Israels security. Why they didn't do that, I guess it depends on the account. I mean, in some articles, I guess us sources will say that the Americans dissuaded them. But even as the Israelis ultimately decided against that, what has, part of the logic of the war that they have waged in Gaza has seemed to have been as a sort of deterrent exercise aimed at Hezbollah and then other regional enemies. I mean, thats why you get israeli officials pointing to very explicitly, right, pointing to Gaza and then saying that we will reproduce this in Beirut, we will do this in Lebanon.

I think that October 7 was a real, seems like it was a real maybe fatal blow to Israels security paradigm. I mean, this idea that the Israelis could unilaterally impose security on their regional surroundings through sheer force, everything that theyve done in Gaza since then, what they've done in Lebanon, what they may do in Lebanon, I don't know if there's a way for them to sort of reconstitute that deterrence, but it looks like that's maybe some of what they've got in mind, in addition to realizing some of these more specific and tangible concerns related to his bull with proximity to the border and then reassuring residents of northern Israel in a way that would permit them to return. But if you can have a ceasefire in Gaza, which unfortunately does not seem imminent currently, it seems like that is a prerequisite for a deal on the blue line. Sam, it's a very curious situation, too, because obviously Hezbollah is the most powerful military force in Lebanon, more so than the lebanese military, but it's not technically democratically accountable to the lebanese people, and it's very polarizing and divisive among some factions of lebanese society and maybe particularly so after the syrian war. How do other parties in Lebanon perceive the situation?

Speaker D
Because obviously, if there was a war which Hezbollah seems to be trying to avoid for the most part, the consequences would still impact Lebanese to some degree without distinction of their political sympathies or other backgrounds. How do Hezbollah fit in politically in Lebanon's domestic political landscape? I think that there is maybe a broader anxiety across Lebanons different political constituencies and factions that this conflict in the south may turn into a fuller, more devastating war. Short of that, I mean, I think that the really pointed and direct criticisms of Hezbollahs involvement and then its now ongoing engagement with the Israelis have mostly been limited to just elements of the christian right. Most of the country, I think, seems sort of tacitly understanding of this, and I think that after, I mean, I guess depending on how you count it, several israeli invasions, extended israeli occupation of the country, Israel's regular attempts to scare, to intimidate lebanese threats to return it to the country to the Stone Age.

Speaker B
Israel is, I think, generally viewed here among not all, but I think most Lebanese as the preeminent threat to Lebanon Hezbollah, which is, yes, controversial for, I think, good reasons, including some of what it's done abroad, some of what it does at home. Nonetheless. I mean, Hezbollah is the only force in Lebanon that's able to stand up and to plausibly deter the Israelis. And I think also it's tough to get kind of a fuller sense of this, but at least anecdotally, I've heard some people say, again, not among elements of more right wing christian parties, but among at least some lebanese Sunnis, for example, who had been alienated from Hezbollah as a result of Hezbollahs involvement in Syria in support of the government of the Assad regime, that theres been some real appreciation for and support of Hezbollah since October, as theyve seen Hezbollah, and then alongside it, some other factions, including Hamas. Palestinian Islamic Jihad has carried out a few actions.

The lebanese chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood has reactivated its armed wing, but principally it is Hezbollah that has been carrying this front and then waging now this extended and costly fight in support of Gaza. Sam my last question, given the implications of this conflict, if it were to take place, a very broad ranging conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, both regionally and for the people of the two countries as well as the broader world, what should us and foreign diplomats be doing to try to bring this conflict to an end? What will be most efficacious in steering off this potential disaster? And what could they do in the short term to try to bring the two sides back from the brink? You need a Gaza ceasefire.

There may have been some optimism earlier on in the war that the US in particular might be able to mediate some agreement to achieve de escalation or calm on the blue line, but it seems like they hit a wall, right? I mean, because I think that it became apparent that really all that the Americans and then other interested outsiders could do was sort of pre cook a deal. Hezbollah isn't willing to engage on the substance currently of any agreement, but then you can talk with some lebanese figures who are proximate to Hezbollah, who I think can plausibly represent its outlook and interests, and then you can sort of pre negotiate an agreement that is likely acceptable to Hizboh. Right. You can have that sort of fleshed out and in place, but then you can't consummate it until you have the Gaza ceasefire, which maybe the Americans thought that they'd have one by now, right.

That was more achievable. It seems like they've made some announcements to that effect prematurely. But because of the way that all these things sort of interlock and fit together, and then because of the so far unavailability of that just like really crucial piece, there is just no immediate prospect for turning this off. And then also. Yeah, and then over the weekend, but then periodically before that, you get these israeli threats to substantially escalate.

And then how credible that is, whether this is the time that it will materialize, who knows? Sam, thanks so much for joining us on intercepted. Thanks for having me on. That was Sam Heller, a researcher and analyst looking at Lebanon, Syria and the wider neighborhood, and a fellow with Century International.

Murtazza Hossein
And that does it for this episode of Intercepted. Intercepted is production of the Intercept. Laura Flynn produced this episode. Rick Kwan mixed our show legal review by David Brelo, Sean Musgrave, and Elizabeth Sanchez. This episode was transcribed by Leonardo Fireman, and our theme music, as always, was composed by DJ Spooky.

Thank you so much to our supporters and listeners. If you haven't already, please subscribe to Intercepted and our other podcasts deconstructed. Also do leave us a rating and review whenever you find our podcast. It helps other listeners to find us as well. If you want to give us additional feedback, email us@podcasteintercept.com.

thank you so much for joining us. Until next time. I'm Mertazza Hossein.

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